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Note 
Assessing Parental Rights for Children with 
Genetic Material from Three Parents 
Daniel Green* 
INTRODUCTION 
A healthy baby boy was born on April 6, 2016.1 Although 
seemingly ordinary on the surface, this event represents a 
monumental scientific advancement in that this child signifies 
the first healthy birth resulting from the genetic material of 
three different people through the use of a procedure known as 
mitochondrial replacement therapy.2 The family adopted this 
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 1.  See Jessica Hamzelou, Exclusive: World’s First Baby Born with New “3 
Parent” Technique, NEW SCIENTIST (Sept. 27, 2016), https://www.newscientist 
.com/article/2107219-exclusive-worlds-first-baby-born-with-new-3-parent-
technique/. 
 2. See Maggie Fox, Baby Born Using ‘Three Parent’ Technique, Doctors 
Say, NBC NEWS (Sept. 28, 2016, 9:41 AM ET), http://www.nbcnews.com 
/health/health-news/baby-born-using-three-parent-technique-doctors-say-
n655701; see also Daniel Green, Three’s a Crowd: Identifying the Shifting 
Parental Rights in Three-Parent Babies, LAWSCI FORUM (Oct. 3, 2016), https:// 
editions.lib.umn.edu/mjlst/threes-a-crowd-identifying-the-shifting-parental-
rights-in-three-parent-babies/. But see Charlotte Pritchard, The Girl with Three 
Biological Parents, BBC NEWS (Sept. 1, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news 
/magazine-28986843. Children have been born with the mitochondrial DNA of 
a third individual before, but there are specific differences between the 
cytoplasmic transfer method used then and mitochondrial replacement therapy 
in use currently. Id. In cytoplasmic transfer, donor mitochondrial DNA is 
injected into the mother’s egg. See Paula Amato et al., Three-Parent In Vitro 
Fertilization: Gene Replacement for the Prevention of Inherited Mitochondrial 
Diseases, 101 FERTILITY & STERILITY 31, 32 (2014). This donor’s mitochondrial 
DNA mixes with the mother’s mitochondrial DNA thereby resulting in both the 
mother’s and the donor’s DNA being existent in the egg compared with 
mitochondrial replacement therapy where nearly all the mitochondrial DNA in 
252 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. [Vol. 19:1 
 
procedure to avoid a genetic defect known to cause Leigh 
syndrome—a disorder which manifests itself in the 
mitochondrial DNA of the mother’s egg and is passed from 
mother to child through birth.3 Leigh syndrome can have 
disastrous effects on the development of organs, especially the 
brain.4 This inherited disease resulted in four previous losses of 
pregnancy for the mother and an additional two deaths of her 
children after birth: one at the age of six years and one at the 
age of eight months.5 In the successful birth, mitochondrial 
replacement therapy provided a way to avoid the genetic defect 
by making use of DNA from three different individuals—two 
women contributed eggs and one man contributed sperm for 
fertilization of the egg.6 Aside from being born slightly 
premature, the child was born healthy thereby assuaging initial 
concerns that the diseased mother’s mitochondrial DNA may 
replicate faster than the treatment could correct.7 
A team of fertility specialists from the United States of 
America and Great Britain completed the treatment in Mexico 
since the procedure has not been approved in the United States, 
but this may not be the case for long given its success.8 If 
approved in the United States, as may likely be the case in the 
near future, the use of mitochondrial replacement therapy 
possesses the potential to alter how courts determine legal 
parentage since such disputes would lead to the first cases over 
children who have the genetic material of three separate 
                                                          
the resulting egg is that of the donor. Id. This means that even less of the child’s 
DNA is attributed to the mitochondrial donor. Id. Furthermore, this procedure 
was halted quickly since several of the resultant children suffered from 
abnormalities that may be attributable to the treatment. See Pritchard, supra 
note 2. 
 3. See Fox, supra note 2; see also Green, supra note 2; NAT’L INST. HEALTH, 
Leigh Syndrome, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, https://ghr.nlm.nih.gov 
/condition/leigh-syndrome (last visited Jan. 18, 2017). 
 4. See NAT’L INST. HEALTH, supra note 3. 
 5. See Hamzelou, supra note 1. 
 6. See Fox, supra note 2; Green, supra note 2. 
 7. Karen Weintraub, “3-Parent Baby” Procedure Faces New Hurdle, SCI. 
AM. (Nov. 30, 2016), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/ldquo-three-
parent-baby-rdquo-procedure-faces-new-hurdle/. 
 8. See Hamzelou, supra note 1 (stating that such success is likely to 
increase progress around the world); see, e.g., Akshat Rathi, The World’s Second 
Three-Parent Baby Has Been Conceived Using a Controversial Technique, 
QUARTZ (Jan. 18, 2017), https://qz.com/887916/the-worlds-second-three-parent-
baby-has-been-conceived-using-a-controversial-pronuclear-transfer-ivf-
technique. 
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individuals. This treatment could lead to a great number of 
disputes given the likelihood of widespread use due to the 
frequency of resultant genetic defects from errors in 
mitochondrial DNA. Given this concern, the legal community 
should proactively recognize and address the challenges 
presented by this emerging field as they occur rather than 
reactively after such inevitable problems arise. 
This Note argues that the legal community should adopt a 
strict rule—similar to the approach taken in organ donation—
when resolving disputes of legal parentage involving 
mitochondrial replacement therapy. This stance would oppose 
the adoption of the common stances currently taken when 
assessing parentage in other methods of assisted reproductive 
therapy. In espousing the outlook of this Note, courts and 
legislatures should adopt a bright line rule which determines 
that the individual donating mitochondrial DNA to the resulting 
child should have no parental rights. The application of this 
default rule should supersede any other determination of legal 
parentage made through the application of other approaches. 
Part I provides a background, explains the science behind 
mitochondrial replacement therapy, and closes with a brief 
overview of legal stances taken in organ donation. Part II goes 
through the different approaches taken in determining legal 
parentage for assisted reproductive technologies, provides 
examples in case law, and explains why they should not apply to 
mitochondrial replacement therapy. Part II further argues that 
the existing approaches taken in assessing legal parentage in 
assisted reproductive technologies cannot be transferred to 
mitochondrial replacement therapy and suggests a bright line 
rule. Lastly, this Note concludes in Part III that the bright line 
rule proposed in Part II should be used in evaluating parentage 
disputes which involve mitochondrial replacement therapy and 
that doing so will reduce the potential for overall uncertainty in 
an already inconsistent area of law. 
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I. BACKGROUND 
A. THE SCIENCE BEHIND THREE-PARENT BABIES 
Mitochondrial replacement therapy (“MRT”) is categorized 
as an assisted reproductive technology (“ART”).9 Unfortunately, 
any form of ART, when used, creates a grey area in assessing 
legal parentage.10 In such disputes, courts have placed emphasis 
on the relationships between the possible parent and the child 
in reaching a resolution.11 In identifying a child’s parents, courts 
have identified three relevant relationships: 
(1) An ‘intended parent’ is a parent who intended to bring a child into 
the world to raise as his or her own; (2) a ‘genetic parent’ is a person 
who shares DNA with the child; and (3) the ‘biological parent’ (also 
called the ‘gestational parent’ or ‘birth mother’) is the woman who 
gave birth to the child.12 
Traditionally, children possess genetic material supplied by 
the sperm and egg of two separate individuals at birth.13 This 
would mean that the three separate labels would generally apply 
to the same two people.14 ART complicates this by separating 
such categories.15 However, even in these disputes, ART leads to 
                                                          
 9. Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32; see also Amy B. Leiser, Note, 
Parentage Disputes in the Age of Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy, 104 GEO. 
L.J. 413, 414 (2016); CELLULAR, TISSUE, & GENE THERAPIES ADVISORY COMM., 
FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., OOCYTE MODIFICATION IN ASSISTED REPRODUCTION FOR 
THE PREVENTION OF TRANSMISSION OF MITOCHONDRIAL DISEASE OR 
TREATMENT OF INFERTILITY 11 (2014) [hereinafter FDA BRIEFING DOCUMENT]. 
 10. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 414. 
 11. Id. at 414–15. 
 12. Id. at 414–15; see SUSAN L. CROCKIN & HOWARD W. JONES, JR., LEGAL 
CONCEPTIONS: THE EVOLVING LAW AND POLICY OF ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 11 (2010) (addressing how the concept of motherhood has 
changed given the scientific advancements in forms of ART); CHARLES P. 
KINDREGAN, JR. & MAUREEN MCBRIEN, ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGY: A LAWYERS GUIDE TO EMERGING LAW AND SCIENCE 2 (2d ed. 
2011) (discussing the creation of new parental concepts such as the “‘intended 
parent,’ ‘gestational carrier,’ and ‘gamete provider’”). 
 13. Lynda Wray Black, The Birth of a Parent: Defining Parentage for 
Lenders of Genetic Material, 92 NEB. L. REV. 799, 812 (2014) (citation omitted) 
(“Notwithstanding the scientific breakthroughs in reproductive technology and 
the more inclusive modern understanding of the family unit, every child begins 
with two (and only two) suppliers of genetic material and one (and only one) 
gestational carrier.”). 
 14. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 415–16. 
 15. Id. 
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a child that is born with genetic material from only two other 
people.16 
MRT, on the other hand, leads to children born with genetic 
material from three different individuals (these children are 
commonly referred to as “three-parent babies”).17 This technique 
divides the label of the genetic parent even further than 
traditional forms of ART in that a single child conceived by MRT 
may have two legitimate “genetic mothers.”18 This situation 
results because MRT works by manipulating egg cells prior to 
fertilization.19 Egg cells consist of “nuclei with nuclear DNA—
the ‘instruction manual’ for the cell—and many intracellular 
organelles that carry on the functions of our cells—the 
‘machinery’ of the cell.”20 Mitochondria are one such organelle 
and are comprised of mitochondrial DNA.21 MRT, then, is a 
process which removes the nucleus from one egg and transfers 
the nucleus into the remnants of a different donated egg (which 
previously had its nucleus removed and discarded).22 The 
resultant egg has a nucleus from one individual (the “nuclear 
mother”) and mitochondrial DNA from a donor (the 
“mitochondrial mother”).23 The father’s sperm then fertilizes the 
newly assembled egg, and it is implanted in the nuclear mother 
in order to begin the pregnancy.24 Because of this process, the 
resultant child possesses DNA from the father, the nuclear 
mother, and the mitochondrial mother.25 However, a comparison 
of the amount of DNA in a child’s cell reveals that the cells 
                                                          
 16. Id. 
 17. Id. at 414. 
 18. See generally id. at 416 (stating that MRT challenges traditional views 
“because children born from MRT have DNA from three different people”). 
 19. There is another variation of conducting MRT involving embryos rather 
than eggs discussed later, but the process shares the same ultimate result that 
a child will be born with DNA from three individuals. See, e.g., sources cited 
supra note 9. 
 20. Leiser, supra note 9, at 414 (citing NAT’L INST. HEALTH, 
Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA), NAT’L HUM. GENOME RES. INST., http://www 
.genome.gov/25520880 (last visited Nov. 28, 2016); NAT’L INST. HEALTH, What 
Is a Cell?, GENETICS HOME REFERENCE, http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/handbook 
/basics/cell (last visited Nov. 28, 2016)). 
 21. Leiser, supra note 9, at 414 (citing FDA BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra 
note 9, at 5). 
 22. See Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32; Leiser, supra note 9, at 414. 
 23. Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32; Leiser, supra note 9, at 414. 
 24. Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32; Leiser, supra note 9, at 414. 
 25. Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32; Leiser, supra note 9, at 414. 
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consist of less than 0.001% of mitochondrial DNA thereby 
making up only 0.1%–0.2% of a person’s genes.26 
Despite the fact that mitochondrial DNA takes up such a 
small percentage of overall DNA and seemingly has no link to a 
child’s appearance or personality, it is vastly important.27 
Defects in mitochondrial DNA have the potential to create 
extremely detrimental genetic diseases that are passed down 
from mother to child.28 Mitochondrial DNA mutations can cause 
diseases and defects in many vital organs including the brain, 
liver, heart, and kidneys, they can affect muscles and the central 
nervous system, and they “may contribute to the development of 
common multifactorial disorders such as diabetes mellitus and 
neurodegenerative disease.”29 Further, mitochondrial DNA in 
women’s eggs also tend to deteriorate as they age thereby 
increasing risks of disorders developing in both the pregnancy 
and the resulting child.30 MRT may have the ability to combat 
                                                          
 26. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 417 n.17 (citing Robert W. Taylor & Doug 
M. Turnbull, Mitochondrial DNA Mutations in Human Disease, 6 NATURE 
REVS. GENETICS 389, 391 (2005)) (“MtDNA contains less than 17,000 base pairs 
and only 37 genes, whereas nuclear DNA contains about 3.3 billion base pairs 
and 20,000–30,000 genes. But see Garry Hamilton, The Hidden Risks for ‘Three-
Person’ Babies, 525 NATURE 444, 445 (2015) (‘Roughly 1,500 nuclear genes are 
involved in mitochondrial function, including around 76 that encode proteins 
which bind to mitochondrially derived peptides.’).”). 
 27. Amato et al., supra note 2, at 31; Leiser, supra note 9, at 417–18. Sperm 
also contribute mitochondria to the resultant embryo, but they are destroyed 
soon after fertilization. See Peter Sutovsky et al., Ubiquitin Tag for Sperm 
Mitochondria, 402 NATURE 371, 371–72 (1999). 
 28. Amato et al., supra note 2, at 31 (stating that defects in mitochondrial 
DNA can result in severe chronic diseases). 
 29. Leiser, supra note 9, at 418; see Amato et al., supra note 2, at 31; see 
also Andrew M. Schaefer et al., The Epidemiology of Mitochondrial Disorders—
Past, Present and Future, 1659 BIOCHIMICA ET BIOPHYSICA ACTA 115, 115 
(2004); Robert W. Taylor & Doug M. Turnbull, Mitochondrial DNA Mutations 
in Human Disease, 6 NATURE REVS. GENETICS 389, 394 (2005). 
 30. See Timothy Wai et al., The Role of Mitochondrial DNA Copy Number 
in Mammalian Fertility, 83 BIOLOGY OF REPROD. 52, 53 (2010); Li-ya Wang et 
al., Mitochondrial Functions on Oocytes and Preimplantation Embryos, 10 J. 
ZHEJIANG U. SCI. B, 483, 486 (2009) (“Natural human fertility decreases with 
the maternal age . . . .”); see also Leiser, supra note 9, at 418 (citations omitted) 
(“Age-related female infertility is also suspected to be associated with reduced 
quantity and mutation of mitochondria women’s eggs. Egg quality is negatively 
correlated with maternal age and mitochondrial DNA damage. Therefore, few, 
low-quality mitochondria in a woman’s eggs could contribute to age-related 
infertility.”). But see FDA BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 9, at 11 (“The 
quality and quantity of mitochondria in the oocyte might contribute to the 
developmental competence of the embryo, and mitochondrial factors might be 
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these as well as other fertility issues in women who wish to 
conceive at an older age, struggle to conceive at a younger one, 
or even in such situations where it would normally be considered 
dangerous for well-being of the mother and the potential child to 
attempt a pregnancy.31 As seen in the aforementioned success 
story, MRT is utilized as a treatment to prevent these genetic 
diseases.32 
There are currently two scientific approaches that could 
consistently lead to successful MRT procedures: spindle transfer 
and pronuclear transfer.33 There was also a previous 
experimental method attempted in the late 1990’s that injected 
healthy mitochondrial DNA into eggs that may have carried 
flawed mitochondrial DNA, but this research was soon halted by 
the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”).34 The FDA blocked 
                                                          
linked to infertility and reproductive aging. However, there is no consensus on 
the extent that female infertility can be attributed to oocyte and embryo 
mitochondrial insufficiency.”). 
 31. See FDA BRIEFING DOCUMENT, supra note 9, at 11 (stating abnormal 
mitochondria in the oocyte could be related to infertility and that these various 
methods might also improve in vitro fertilization (IVF) outcomes for infertile 
women); Leiser, supra note 9, at 420. 
 32. See Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32; Hamzelou, supra note 1; Leiser, 
supra note 9, at 420. 
 33. See Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32–34. Interestingly, it appears that 
both techniques of producing children are successful as seen in the two case 
studies, cited earlier in this Note. Compare Rathi, supra note 8, with Hamzelou, 
supra note 1. 
 34. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 289g(a)(1)–(2) (2012) (stating that research and 
experimentation on a nonviable living human fetus ex utero or a living human 
fetus ex utero for whom viability has not been ascertained may not be conducted 
unless it may enhance the well-being of the fetus or it will pose no added risk of 
suffering, injury, or death to the fetus); see Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32–35. 
Although no federal law bans human embryo research in the United 
States, there are restrictions on funding. . . . [T]he Dickey-Wicker 
amendment, prohibits the creation of human embryos for research 
purposes or research in which a human embryo is harmed or 
destroyed. Several states, such as California and New York, provide 
funding support for embryonic stem cell research. However, some 
states, such as California, ban compensation of oocyte donors for 
research. 
Id. at 35; Gina Kolata, Birth of Baby with Three Parents’ DNA Marks Success 
for Banned Technique, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2016/09/28/health/birth-of-3-parent-baby-a-success-for-controversial-
procedure.html (“More than a decade ago — before controversy forced the work 
to stop — researchers tried a simpler technique that did not involve swapping 
nuclei between eggs. Instead, they injected some healthy mitochondria into an 
egg in an attempt to help with repeated failures at in vitro fertilization. It was 
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this third form of research by passing regulations requiring FDA 
approval for such research through an application process.35 
Congress then followed the FDA’s actions with legislation, 
premised on ethical concerns for the safety of the children 
potentially resulting from third method, which made it 
impossible for such research to be funded.36 
The FDA has not yet approved either spindle or pronuclear 
transfer, but this may soon change given the recent success 
stories surrounding MRT.37 It is likely that the FDA will favor 
spindle transfer over pronuclear transfer due to the existence of 
certain ethical concerns.38 Pronuclear transfer requires the 
destruction of embryos since the removal of the nucleus takes 
place after fertilization of the egg, whereas, in spindle transfer, 
the removal of the nucleus occurs prior to fertilization.39 Thus, 
pronuclear transfer requires the destruction of an embryo while 
spindle transfer does not.40 Spindle transfer may open a door for 
the FDA to follow actions taken in other countries, such as the 
United Kingdom,41 and allow MRT research and treatment to 
                                                          
not a method that could be used to prevent the birth of children with 
mitochondrial diseases.”). 
 35. 42 U.S.C. § 289g(a)(1)–(2); see Amato et al., supra note 2, at 34–35 
(stating that in vitro research using human embryos is controversial; however, 
one advantage of spindle transfer over pronuclear transfer is that the donor 
oocytes need not be fertilized, which would avoid the creation and destruction 
of embryos for the sole purpose of medical treatment). 
 36. 42 U.S.C. § 289g(a)(1)–(2). 
 37. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 289g; Amato et al., supra note 2, at 34–35; Kolata, 
supra note 34. The spindle transfer technique is more thoroughly researched 
than the pronuclear transfer technique. Leiser, supra note 9, at 421–22. The 
spindle transfer method was successfully used in 2012 to create human embryos 
in which all of the mitochondria came from a donor egg. Id. The technique has 
also been demonstrated to work with previously frozen eggs. Id. Both 
techniques must clear significant regulatory hurdles before either can be 
clinically used. Id. The FDA convened in February 2014 to consider the 
technology’s safety. Id. Since then, the Institute of Medicine has begun 
conducting a series of meetings to discuss related ethical and social policy 
issues, and the British Parliament has voted to allow MRT to be used by 
specially licensed researchers. Id. 
 38. See Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32–35; Kolata, supra note 34. 
 39. See Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32–35; Kolata, supra note 34. 
 40. See Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32–35; Kolata, supra note 34. 
 41. Michael Le Page, UK Becomes First Country to Give Go Ahead to Three-
Parent Babies, NEW SCIENTIST (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.newscientist.com 
/article/2116407-uk-becomes-first-country-to-give-go-ahead-to-three-parent-
babies/ (“[The United Kingdom’s] Human Fertilisation and Embryo Authority 
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take place in the United States.42 This approach, if approved, 
would likely gain strong public support given that, as of now, the 
only way to prevent the transmission of a mitochondrial disorder 
or disease during pregnancy is through whole egg or embryo 
donation.43 
B. CURRENT POSSIBILITIES FOR LEGAL PARENTHOOD OF THREE-
PARENT BABIES 
1. Legal Principles of Other Assisted Reproductive 
Technologies 
In both whole egg donation and embryo donation the 
resulting child possesses genetic material from only two people 
as opposed to the three that results from MRT.44 Whole egg 
donation requires an egg donor, similar to the need for an egg 
donor in MRT, except that no transfer takes place between the 
birth mother’s45 egg and the egg provided by the donor.46 After 
the egg donation, the father’s sperm then fertilizes the donated 
egg, and the resultant embryo is implanted into the birth 
mother.47 The child that results then has genetic material of only 
the father and the egg donor since the mere implantation of an 
egg in an individual does not add any genetic material to the 
embryo.48 
In embryo donation, both egg and sperm donors are 
recruited for the process and the resultant embryo is, again, 
implanted in the birth mother.49 The child that follows has 
genetic material of only the egg and sperm donors.50 Meaning 
                                                          
has given a cautious go-ahead to the use of mitochondrial replacement therapy 
to prevent mitochondrial disorders, which can be fatal.”). 
 42. See Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32–35; Kolata, supra note 34. 
 43. See Amato et al., supra note 2, at 32–35; Leiser, supra note 9, at 421. 
 44. See KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 12, at 105–07; Leiser, supra 
note 9, at 418 (“With whole egg donation, the intending parents use only an egg 
donor, whereas with embryo donation, the intending parents use both an egg 
donor and a sperm donor.”). 
 45. Use of the label of birth mother in this instance assumes that surrogacy 
is not employed. 
 46. Leiser, supra note 9, at 418. 
 47. KINDREGAN & MCBRIEN, supra note 12, at 105. 
 48. Id. at 107. 
 49. Id. The label of birth mother, again, assumes that surrogacy is not 
employed. 
 50. Id. 
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that the possibility exists that—if both egg and sperm donors are 
employed for a single couple—the resulting parents may not 
share any genetic material with the child.51 In contrast, the 
purpose of MRT is to employ only mitochondrial DNA—rather 
than the entire DNA—from a donor, and an intervening 
scientific event—MRT—takes place.52 Despite the distinct 
differences between these two techniques, it has been proposed 
that the way the law treats these forms of ART may provide 
valuable inferences as to how parental rights should be assigned 
in cases of MRT.53 
As for ART, it may be suggested that there are four common 
approaches courts adhere to when resolving disputes where 
parentage is at issue: the application of state statutes and public 
policy, basing the decision on the best interests of the child, 
assigning parentage based on genetic relationship to the child, 
and assigning parental rights based on the intent of the 
potential parents.54 Regardless of what test is relied upon, in 
resolving parental disputes in ART, court decisions have 
reflected tendencies to reach the same result as if the intent test 
had been used, and, because of these similar end results, it has 
been argued that the intent test would be the best method to 
adhere to due to its consistency and applicability.55 However, 
each of these approaches, including the intent test, should not 
be applied to parentage disputes involving MRT because the 
process and nature of MRT reveals similarities to organ donation 
that render traditional ART approaches inapplicable. 
2. Legal Principles of Organ Donation 
When assessing the most applicable law in parentage 
disputes arising from MRT, an understanding of the basic legal 
                                                          
 51. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 422. 
 52. Id. at 420–22 (explaining that MRT transfers the nuclear DNA of the 
intending mother into a donor egg with healthy mitochondria, ensuring the 
resulting child will also have healthy mitochondria). 
 53. See generally Leiser, supra note 9, at 422–26. 
 54. See Mary Patricia Byrn & Lisa Giddings, An Empirical Analysis of the 
Use of the Intent Test to Determine Parentage in Assisted Reproductive 
Technology Cases, 50 HOUS. L. REV. 1295, 1301 (2013). Although Byrn & 
Giddings set for five different approaches, I merge the state statutes and public 
policy approaches in this Note because of the interplay that public policy has in 
the interpretation of state statutes. 
 55. Id. at 1324 
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principles of organ donation is needed.56 In organ donation, it is 
widely accepted that a willing donor loses the property rights in 
his or her bodily materials at the point that it becomes fully 
integrated in the recipient.57 However, the process becomes 
complicated in determining at what point in the procedure “full 
integration” occurs for the tissues and organs involved and when 
the donor loses all property rights in such materials.58 Given this 
grey area, courts have ruled that the medical personnel handling 
donated material are accountable to both the recipient’s as well 
as the donor’s wishes.59 In order to promote clarity, many courts 
have determined that a donor must make his or her wishes 
known prior to the abandonment of materials because cells 
without a designated use are often considered abandoned when 
removed from an individual.60 Courts have held firm to this 
conclusion even if value is later given to the removed bodily 
materials through sophisticated biotechnological techniques.61 
Because the donor in MRT provides, at the time of donation, a 
fully functional egg with the understanding that it is to be 
altered,62 the conclusions held by these courts provide insight 
                                                          
 56. As there exists a great deal of debate in the area of post-mortem 
property rights and donation, this Note will simplify the matter by limiting the 
comparison of the MRT process with inter vivos donations from consensual 
donors. 
 57. See Bernard M. Dickens, Living Tissue and Organ Donors and Property 
Law: More on Moore, 8 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 73, 90 (1992) (citing 
Venner v. Maryland, 354 A.2d 483, 499 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1976) (“[W]hen a 
person does nothing and says nothing to indicate an intent to assert his right of 
ownership, possession, or control over such material [as comes from his body], 
the only rational inference is that he intends to abandon the material.”)) 
(explaining when a person makes clear her intention that the material should 
be transplanted into a designated recipient, that person asserts a right of 
ownership and control until the transplantation takes place, and those who 
control property can lawfully direct not only its use but also its return or 
deliberate destruction). Thus, “[w]hen couples deposit their gametes for in vitro 
fertilization, they intend exclusive use for themselves and possess the legal 
power to forbid any other reproductive use.” Id. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id.; see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 502 
(Cal. 1990) (Broussard, J., dissenting) (“It is also clear, under traditional 
common law principles, that this right of a patient to control the future use of 
his organ is protected by the law of conversion.”). 
 60. See Dickens, supra note 57, at 86–87. See generally Moore, 793 P.2d at 
492–93. 
 61. Dickens, supra note 57, at 86–87. 
 62. See generally sources cited supra notes 19–25 (explaining the process of 
MRT). 
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and clarification as to how parental rights should be assigned if 
a dispute arises over a child conceived through the use of MRT.63 
II. ANALYSIS 
A. THE INTENT BASED TEST AND WHY IT DOES NOT APPLY TO 
MRT 
As previously discussed, courts appear to have adopted four 
common methods to assess legal parentage in cases of ART.64 
Although courts and academics seem to champion the intent 
test,65 each test possesses its own unique strengths when applied 
to a dispute involving children conceived through ART,66 but 
each method fails in its ability to provide a proper solution to 
disputes in parentage stemming from MRT. 
1. The Application of Existing State Statutes to Matters of 
MRT 
Certain states have crafted statutes in an attempt to 
proactively address the problem surrounding legal parentage of 
ART methods.67 As such, these existing statutes have the 
potential to extend to MRT matters since MRT is categorized as 
a form of ART.68 However, even when applied to legal issues 
involving traditional ART, the wording and structure of these 
statutes tend to limit their applicability.69 Often statutes tend to 
make use of ambiguous and overgeneralized wording which 
hinders clear application to matters of ART.70 Ambiguity in 
statutes implicitly creates inconsistencies in the application of 
the law because it allows for courts to interpret statutes in ways 
often contrary to their intended meaning.71 The lack of 
consistency, even in the various forms of traditional ART 
                                                          
 63. See Moore, 793 P.2d at 493. 
 64. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1301; Leiser supra note 9, at 
423. 
 65. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1324; see also Leiser, supra note 
9, at 425–26. 
 66. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1301–09. 
 67. See id. at 1301–02. 
 68. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 414. 
 69. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1301–02; see also Leiser, supra 
note 9, at 424. 
 70. See generally Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1301–02. 
 71. See id. at 1301–04. 
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disputes, suggests that it may be impractical to apply this 
approach to the unique scientific processes that constitute 
MRT.72 
For example, in Minnesota there exists a statute which 
states that when, “with the consent of her husband, a wife is 
inseminated artificially with semen donated by a man not her 
husband, the husband is treated in law as if he were the 
biological father of a child thereby conceived,” and that “[t]he 
donor of semen provided to a licensed physician for use in 
artificial insemination of a married woman other than the 
donor’s wife is treated in law as if he were not the biological 
father of a child thereby conceived.”73 This statute offers a clear 
attempt to address the issue of legal parentage in a case of ART 
before it arises.74 However, it falls short of addressing how legal 
parentage may ensue when the couple is unmarried, if the couple 
makes use of egg donation rather than sperm donation, or, 
especially important in the matter of this Note, whether such a 
couple utilizes MRT.75 
In order to address these shortcomings, states often attempt 
to circumvent such problems by interpreting statutes broadly 
before applying them to a situation that can, at times, greatly 
deviate from their intended meanings.76 For example, the same 
Minnesota statute mentioned above has been applied to assess 
paternity in a situation where an unwed homosexual couple 
wished to conceive a child through surrogacy—an ART situation 
that plain language of the statute clearly does not address.77 In 
this approach, a court broadened the interpretation of the 
statute so as to reach an understanding that—despite the use of 
spousal terms—the statute did not require marriage and, 
therefore, granted parentage to both the biological father and 
the woman who served as both egg donor and surrogate.78 
However, the court also applied a narrow construal of the statute 
                                                          
 72. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 423–24. 
 73. MINN. STAT. § 257.56 (2016). 
 74. See id. 
 75. See id. 
 76. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1303. 
 77. A.L.S. ex rel. J.P. v. E.A.G, No. A10-443, 2010 WL 4181449, at *3 (Minn. 
Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2010). 
 78. See id. 
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by declining to attribute parentage to the biological father’s 
same-sex partner.79 
While this approach seems effective at first glance, different 
courts can vary drastically in their interpretations.80 In contrast 
to the Minnesota court, the Oregon Court of Appeals in 
Shineovich v. Shineovich granted parental rights to a biological 
mother’s same-sex partner through the application of an ART 
statute similar to that of the previously mentioned Minnesota 
statute.81 In acting this way, the Oregon Court of Appeals 
claimed that the ruling “advances the legislative objective” set 
forth by the statute.82 
States have also applied public policy to ART parentage 
disputes in order to fill in the gaps left by ART statutes.83 For 
example, in Debra H. v. Janice R., the New York Court of 
Appeals recognized parentage by a civil union.84 This union gave 
rise to a situation where the biological mother’s former partner 
also possessed maternal rights over the child.85 However, 
approaches based on policy alone provide even less guidance 
than state statues and are, therefore, far too inconsistent 
between decisions and states so as to provide a solution to 
disputes arising from the use of MRT.86 This lack of consistency 
can be seen even in the established realm of ART by comparing 
the result of Debra H. v. Janice R. with an opinion by the 
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts stating that 
“‘parenthood by contract’ is not the law of Massachusetts and the 
agreement is unenforceable as against public policy.”87 
These results sum up the main problems with the 
application of state statutes to MRT: the view is premised on the 
notion that states have passed relevant ART statutes which 
possess the opportunity for further interpretation, and, even if 
                                                          
 79. See id. 
 80. Compare id., with Shineovich v. Shineovich, 214 P.3d 29, 39–40 (Or. Ct. 
App. 2009). 
 81. See Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 39–40. 
 82. Shineovich, 214 P.3d at 40 (referring to the legislative objective as 
offering protection for children). 
 83. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1304–06. 
 84. Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 196 (N.Y. 2010). 
 85. Id. at 186. 
 86. See generally Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1304–06; Leiser, supra 
note 9, at 424. 
 87. Compare Debra H., 930 N.E.2d at 196, with T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 
1244, 1246 (Mass. 2012). 
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they have, that such statutes can achieve consistent, 
predictable, and intended results.88 Unfortunately, these notions 
are inapplicable to MRT, thereby necessitating the creation of a 
new applicable rule. 
2. Basing the Decision on the Best Interests of the Child 
The assignment of legal parentage according to the court’s 
opinion of the best interests of the child tends to foster the most 
emotional appeal among individuals even though it lacks 
specificity.89 Rubano v. DiCenzo exemplified this principle when 
the Rhode Island Supreme Court determined that a biological 
mother’s former same-sex partner also had maternal rights to 
the child because, contrary to the biological mother’s wishes, the 
partner was deemed a de facto parent.90 The court wished to act 
in the child’s best interest because the petitioner had an 
established relationship with the child which had been fostered 
over a span of years.91 
Though basing a decision on the best interests of the child 
appeals to many, it falls short from several standpoints. First, 
this concept must be approached on a case-by-case basis which 
removes the likelihood of attaining consistent, predictable, and 
uniform results. These tenets of law matter because, when 
present, parties looking to previous results of disputes at the 
beginning stages of an ART or MRT process can predict disputes 
and plan for them ahead of time.92 If parentage rights are 
assessed on a case-by-case basis parties may not be able to 
foresee the potential results of the dispute or even what rights 
they may have in regards to the child at the outset.93 This 
encourages litigation over potentially mutual agreement 
through settlement.94 
                                                          
 88. See generally Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1304–06. 
 89. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 425; see also Byrn & Giddings, supra note 
54, at 1306. 
 90. Rubano v. DiCenzo, 759 A.2d 959, 975–76 (R.I. 2000). 
 91. See id. at 976. 
 92. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 423 (“Variation in the law . . . establishes 
significant uncertainty for intending parents regarding the protection of their 
legal parentage rights in the face of changing circumstances, such as divorce or 
remarriage.”). 
 93. Id. 
 94. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1296–97 (referencing the result 
that litigation may be necessary to determine legal parentage). 
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Second, and most problematic, this approach necessitates 
an extended evidentiary process in order to determine the 
subjective best interests of the child. Such assessments could 
take a significant amount of time subjecting not only the 
parents, but also the child, to an incredibly stressful and 
adversarial situation. If such proceedings drag on, the legal 
dispute itself could become traumatic for a child and result in a 
paradoxical situation where an approach designed to achieve an 
outcome best for a child actually creates a situation detrimental 
to the child’s health and well-being. In regards to MRT, a bright 
line rule would achieve a result in an expedited fashion and may 
even prevent legal controversies from arising in the first place 
through increased clarity of the resulting parental rights at the 
outset of the procedure. 
3. Assigning Parental Rights Based on Genetic Relationship 
to the Child 
Approaching the question of legal parentage by focusing on 
the genetic relationship between the child and the individuals in 
dispute solves many of the problems faced by the previous 
methods, particularly those of efficiency and consistency.95 For 
example, in Ohio, the decision reached by the court of Belsito v. 
Clark articulated the approach’s analysis well when concluding 
that surrogacy was secondary to genetics in its determination as 
to which parents had legal rights—providing, ultimately, that 
the genetic parents had not waived their rights.96 However, most 
courts do not favor this approach for ART because it raises new 
problems in that it may not always result in an outcome best for 
the well-being of the child due to its lack of policy 
consideration.97 For example, it can be easily hypothesized, in 
terms of ART, that an intended mother and intended father may 
conceive a child where the intended mother bears the child, but, 
in doing so, the couple makes use of a donor egg fertilized by the 
intended father’s sperm. In such a situation, even if the egg 
donor waived her rights and wanted nothing to do with the child, 
the birth mother would never be considered a legal parent or, at 
the very least, her parentage would be second to the father’s 
                                                          
 95. See, e.g., Belsito v. Clark, 644 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Ohio Com. Pleas 1994). 
 96. Id. at 766–67. 
 97. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 2 (referencing a child with genetic 
material from three individuals who, though grateful, wants nothing to do with 
the mitochondrial donor). 
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rights since bearing the child would be considered secondary to 
the genes that the child carries.98 Evidently, this result could 
create numerous issues if divorce were ever to ensue. 
Admittedly, the above hypothetical would provide less of a 
problem when it comes to MRT as it would not exclude any of 
the individuals involved in the process since they each 
contribute genetic material—the mitochondrial mother would 
simply be considered an additional third parent unless she had 
waived her rights. Further, this stance would streamline the 
process in most situations as the results are clear cut and may 
be attained concretely through a DNA test.99 However, this 
approach is fundamentally flawed in its assumption that, unless 
waived, the mitochondrial mother should have equal rights to 
legal parentage just because the child’s genetic makeup reflects 
her DNA—especially since the mitochondrial mother’s genetic 
material makes up a minute fraction of the child’s overall 
DNA.100 
4. Assigning Parental Rights Based on the Intent of Potential 
Parents 
Regarding ART, legal scholars have championed an intent-
based test due to its ability to solve many of the problems 
inherent in the previous approaches.101 One of the most 
historically influential and notable cases, although now 
superseded by California statute, which based its determination 
of parentage on intent is Johnson v. Calvert.102 The court in this 
case, confronted with the issue of gestational surrogacy, stated 
that “she who intended to procreate the child—that is, she who 
intended to bring about the birth of a child that she intended to 
raise as her own—is the natural mother under California 
law.”103 Since this decision, numerous other courts have 
                                                          
 98. Belsito, 644 N.E.2d at 767 (describing that there are instances where 
giving birth is “subordinate and secondary to genetics” when assessing 
parentage). 
 99. Id. at 766–67 (describing the relative certainty of DNA tests). 
 100. See infra Part II.B. 
 101. See generally Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54 (determining that the 
intent approach is the most common-sense approach when assessing parentage 
in disputes involving ARTs). 
 102. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 7962 (West 2017). See generally Johnson v. 
Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 1993). 
 103. Johnson, 851 P.2d at 782. 
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broadened and applied this interpretation104 to set forth an 
understanding that “‘when a child is conceived via ART, the 
person(s) that intended to bring the child into the world and 
raise the child should be the child’s legal parent(s).”105 The 
Supreme Court of Indiana further exemplified the spread of this 
approach and its continued use through its decision in Levin v. 
Levin by holding that, despite no genetic link to the child, a man 
was legally the father of a child after he and the child’s mother 
had divorced.106 This was due to the court’s determination that 
he had encouraged the artificial insemination and promised to 
“become the father of the resulting child and to assume his 
support.”107 Evidently, courts have, without much difficulty, 
applied the intent test to instances of parentage disputes 
involving ART. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the intent test 
would be the ideal approach to situations involving MRT.108 A 
significant aspect of this argument refers to the similarities 
between gamete donation of some forms of ART and MRT.109 
However, the intent based approach leaves the door open for 
dispute over ambiguity when seemingly donative actions take 
place. The issue occurs when lines blur between whether an 
individual acts as a “true donor” or an “intentional lender of 
                                                          
 104. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1308 (referencing the following 
cases: McDonald v. McDonald, 608 N.Y.S.2d 477, 480–81 (App. Div. 1994); Goad 
v. Arel, No. FA074025574, 2007 WL 4711515, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. May 24, 
2007); Wray v. Samuel, No. FA074024921, 2007 WL 4711519, at *1 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Apr. 20, 2007); Caliendo v. Mariano, No. FA074023465S, 2007 WL 
4711520, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 4, 2007); Caird v. Lugo, No. FA064017776, 
2006 WL 5242383, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 2, 2006); DiComo v. Hopkins, 
No. FA054007885S, 2005 WL 6007836, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar. 7, 2005); 
Velardo v. Murray, No. 485648, 2004 WL 5506691, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Jan. 
22, 2004); Friend v. Lugo, No. CV020467901, 2002 WL 34370247, at *1 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2002); Hatzopoulos v. Murray, No. FA020460329S, 2002 WL 
34370245, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 15, 2002); Vogel v. Kirkbride, No. FA 02-
0471850, 2002 WL 34119315, *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Dec. 18, 2002)). 
 105. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 425 (quoting Byrn & Giddings, supra note 
54, at 1296 and citing Marjorie Maguire Shultz, Reproductive Technology and 
Intent-Based Parenthood: An Opportunity for Gender Neutrality, 1990 WIS. L. 
REV. 297, 322–25 (1990)). 
 106. Levin v. Levin, 645 N.E.2d 601, 604–05 (Ind. 1994). 
 107. Id. 
 108. See, e.g., Leiser, supra note 9, at 430–31. 
 109. Id. at 429–31. 
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procreative genetic material.”110 The intent test suggests that 
when a dispute arises as to whether an individual intended to 
become a true donor or an intentional lender of procreative 
genetic material, the court should focus on the relationship 
between the parties.111 However, the focus on the relationship 
between the parties creates inconsistent and even conflicting 
results. For example, K.M. v. E.G. offers an instance where a 
same-sex couple agreed to have a child. 112 In this agreement, 
one provided the egg, and the other bore and gave birth to the 
child.113 After the couple broke up, E.G., who gave birth to the 
child, attempted to argue that K.M. was a true donor.114 Despite 
this argument, the California Supreme Court held that because 
K.M. intended to jointly raise the child with E.G. in their home, 
K.M’s parental rights should be legally recognized.115 In 
contrast, in Leckie & Voorhies the Oregon Court of Appeals 
considered a sperm donor to have assumed the role of a true 
donor to a lesbian couple even though he had multiple 
interactions with the child.116 In his role as a true donor, the 
court ruled that he waived his parental rights.117 
Another reason mentioned in support of the intent test is 
that it would easily fall in line with the general approach taken 
towards ART and, thus, would avoid creating a subsect from the 
other forms of ART.118 However, this desire does not justify 
bending the intent test to fit MRT parentage disputes due to the 
drastically different processes that occur between ART egg or 
gamete donation and that of MRT. MRT involves a process that 
incorporates an intervening event and implicitly makes a true 
                                                          
 110. See id. at 428 (“A true donor is someone who contributes his or her 
gametes to someone else with no intention of parenting the resulting child, 
whereas an intentional lender of procreative genetic material is someone who 
contributes his or her gametes for the purpose of having a child whom he or she 
intends to parent.”) (citing Black, supra note 13, at 816–17). 
 111. Id. at 429. 
 112. K.M. v. E.G., 117 P.3d 673, 675–76 (Cal. 2005). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 677. 
 115. Id. at 682. 
 116. Leckie & Voorhies, 875 P.2d 521, 522–23 (Or. Ct. App. 1994). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Byrn & Giddings, supra note 54, at 1297 (stating that, in over 
seventy-four percent of cases where there was a parentage dispute involving 
ART, the result would have been the same if the courts had applied intent test 
instead). 
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donor of the mitochondrial mother each time.119 Because ART 
and MRT incorporate different scientific procedures that achieve 
scientifically different results, MRT necessitates the creation of 
a separate rule.120 
B. COURTS AND LEGISLATURES SHOULD ADOPT A RULE THAT 
THE MITOCHONDRIAL MOTHER HAS NO PARENTAL RIGHTS 
MRT necessitates an alternative approach to legal 
parentage compared to those approaches suggested previously. 
Courts and legislatures should uniformly adopt a rule that the 
mitochondrial mother has no claim over a child conceived 
through the use of MRT. Adoption of a bright line rule makes 
application easy, simplifies the dispute resolution process, 
lowers the possibility for disputes to arise, increases efficiency, 
and does not disrupt the previous approaches to ART.121 Organ 
donation should provide the framework for such a rule in that 
the mitochondrial mother, as a true donor, would have no legal 
parentage rights, even if considered an intending parent.122 The 
science behind MRT procedures, in both its process and outcome, 
logically leads to the adoption of this stance.123 
The intent test assumes that the mitochondrial mother has 
the potential to assume claim to the child. However, unlike egg, 
sperm, or gamete donation, a constructive process takes place 
prior to implantation.124 The resultant egg does not contain the 
nucleus of the mitochondrial mother’s original egg, but, instead, 
                                                          
 119. See generally sources cited supra notes 19–25 (explaining the process of 
MRT). 
 120. See infra Part II.B. 
 121. Britain’s Human Fertilisation and Embryology Authority (HFEA) has 
already adopted such a bright line rule upon legalizing MRT procedures. Ian 
Sample, First UK Baby with DNA from Three People Could Be Born Next Year, 
THE GUARDIAN, (Dec. 15, 2016), https://www.theguardian.com/science/2016/dec 
/15/three-parent-embryos-regulator-gives-green-light-to-uk-clinics 
(determining that the mitochondrial mother has no parental claim on the 
resulting child). 
 122. Ideally, states could allow for couples to contract, prior to the procedure, 
to extend parental rights over the child to the mitochondrial mother. This would 
eliminate much of the confusion in later determination. However, the great 
majority of states do not support the theory that parental rights can be assigned 
by contract alone. See, e.g., T.F. v. B.L., 813 N.E.2d 1244, 1246 (Mass. 2004). 
 123. See generally sources cited supra notes 19–26 (explaining the process 
and result of MRT). 
 124. See generally sources cited supra notes 19–25. 
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that of the nuclear mother.125 The process to achieve such a 
result involves intricate scientific procedures and creates what 
may be argued to be a new egg in that it possesses a different 
structure and genetic material from a combination of the nuclear 
and mitochondrial mothers’ eggs.126 
Such an application of medical science parallels the 
reasoning in Moore v. Regents of the University of California.127 
In this case, Moore had certain tissues removed from his body 
due to surgery.128 These tissues were then subjected to medical 
experiments leading to commercial and scientific enterprises.129 
Moore attempted to assert property rights over the researchers’ 
resulting patent by claiming conversion, but the court denied his 
claim.130 A primary reason why the court denied his claim was 
the fact that the experiments yielded a cell line that was both 
factually and legally distinct from those tissues initially 
surrendered.131 Even though such tissues do not provide a 
perfect analogy to MRT and reproductive substances, it gives 
insight in that both the cell line and the resultant egg from MRT 
become distinct from the initial organic substances.132 The eggs 
contributed by the mitochondrial mother to MRT, just like 
Moore’s tissues, have the potential to become the final product 
through the application of an intricate scientific procedure and 
do not possess such an ability on their own.133 
Opposition to this stance may set forth counterarguments 
that such an intervening process could sever the nuclear 
mother’s property rights as well. However, this assertion fails 
due to the reason as to why the scientific process was done in 
                                                          
 125. See generally sources cited supra notes 19–25. 
 126. See generally sources cited supra notes 19–25. 
 127. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
 128. See id. at 481. 
 129. See id. at 481–82. 
 130. See id. at 497. 
 131. See id. at 492–93 (citing Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309–
10 (1980)). The court stated that the cell line was both factually and legally 
distinct from the cells taken from Moore’s body. Id. Federal law permits the 
patenting of organisms that represent the product of ‘human ingenuity,’ but not 
naturally occurring organisms. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2012); see also Dickens, supra 
note 57, at 77. 
 132. Compare Moore, 793 P.2d at 492–93 (holding that the new cell line was 
factually distinct from Moore’s original cells), with sources cited supra notes 19–
26 (explaining that the mitochondrial donor’s egg is stripped of its nucleus and 
combined with the nuclear mother’s nucleus). 
 133. See sources cited supra note 132. 
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Moore which distinguishes itself from the MRT process. In 
Moore, the doctors, as agents of the Regents of the University of 
California, developed the tissues into a new substance for their 
own gain.134 As such, the Regents of the University of California 
and its doctors reaped the benefits from the procedure.135 In the 
context of MRT, the doctors are creating the new egg for the 
benefit of the nuclear mother, not themselves. Therefore, the 
nuclear mother reaps the overall benefit since the doctors act on 
her behalf. 
As an additional point, the function of the tissues may be 
looked at for guidance. In MRT, the nucleus of the nuclear 
mother’s egg receives the fraction of mitochondrial DNA which 
will help it grow and develop as opposed to the nucleus being 
given to the mitochondrial DNA.136 In MRT, doctors destroy the 
mitochondrial mother’s healthy egg that possesses all the 
potential to function, and take only the mitochondrial DNA. 
Thus, one cannot logically say that the procedure is done for the 
benefit of the mitochondrial mother’s egg. In essence, the process 
of MRT appears to assign priority to the nuclear mother because 
the procedure is undergone for her benefit and that of her egg 
rather than for the benefit of the doctors handling the procedure, 
the mitochondrial mother, or the mitochondrial mother’s egg.137 
In addition to the relevance of the decision in Moore, the 
mitochondrial mother becomes further removed from the child 
when assessing the DNA contributed to the child in detail. For 
example, proponents of an intent test may argue that the 
amount of DNA should not guide a determination of parental 
rights even though the mitochondrial mother adds a virtually 
negligible amount of DNA to the child—less than 0.001%.138 
However, courts should recognize that this miniscule amount of 
DNA provides insight into the intent of the mitochondrial 
mother. Donating a certain fraction of DNA suggests that the 
                                                          
 134. Moore, 793 P.2d at 481–82. 
 135. Id. at 481–82. 
 136. See sources cited supra note 28 (explaining the effect that healthy 
mitochondrial DNA has on development as opposed to unhealthy mitochondrial 
DNA). 
 137. See Dickens, supra note 57, at 90 (describing how the medical staff 
serves the indented recipient while only having a duty to the donor to their use 
or misuse of the material). 
 138. See Pritchard, supra note 2 (demonstrating that a child with DNA from 
three individuals does not want a relationship with the mitochondrial mother 
since the amount of DNA is so small). 
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mitochondrial mother intends to proceed as a true donor because 
of the difference between the DNA in the nucleus and the DNA 
in the mitochondria. In MRT, the nucleus of an egg contains the 
chromosomes contributed to a child whereas the mitochondrial 
DNA only assists in development.139 As such, the resulting child 
from MRT will derive its physical appearance and personality 
from the nuclear mother and will not bear a resemblance to the 
mitochondrial mother.140 This further demonstrates the 
destruction of the unique aspects of the mitochondrial mother’s 
egg and a severance of connections to the mitochondrial 
mother.141 
Opponents of this view may argue that, while the 
mitochondrial mother contributes only a very little amount of 
DNA and such DNA does not guide the development of the 
child’s traits, the DNA contributed is no less vital to the 
development of the child.142 Therefore, based upon the value of 
the contribution, the mitochondrial mother should then have a 
claim to parental rights. While true that the child may not 
develop naturally without such a donation, this claim is merely 
based on the assumption, rather than the guarantee. There 
almost always remains a chance in instances of defects in 
mitochondrial DNA such as in Leigh Syndrome, regardless of 
how slim, that the egg in which the nucleus originally came from 
may develop naturally.143 Assigning value based on chance is not 
a firm basis for parentage decisions. Furthermore, a parallel 
may be drawn to inter vivos kidney donation in that the donee 
ends up containing a small amount of the donor’s DNA (located 
in the donated organ), and the gift may be considered life 
giving.144 In inter vivos donation, any possession of a donated 
                                                          
 139. See Pritchard, supra note 2; see also Jessie Szalay, Chromosomes: 
Definition & Structure, LIVE SCI. (Feb. 19, 2013, 5:51 PM EST), https://www 
.livescience.com/27248-chromosomes.html (explaining that chromosomes are 
located within the nucleus of the cell). 
 140. Kolata, supra note 34 (“The genes for traits that make up a person’s 
appearance and other characteristics are carried in the nuclear DNA. If a white 
woman got mitochondria from an Asian woman, for example, her babies would 
be white, with no traces of the Asian mitochondrial donor.”). 
 141. See Pritchard, supra note 2; see also Szalay, supra note 139. 
 142. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 28–31 (listing the detrimental effects 
that flawed mitochondrial DNA can cause). 
 143. See NAT’L INST. HEALTH, supra note 4. 
 144. See, e.g., sources cited supra notes 28–31 (listing the detrimental effects 
that flawed mitochondrial DNA can cause). 
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organ or gift is relinquished upon implementation in a new 
individual.145 Here, the egg similarly receives what should be 
considered a donation of vital mitochondrial DNA and 
intracellular organelles from the mitochondrial mother’s egg.146 
Kidney donation helps an individual to function without altering 
the individual’s traits, and, likewise, the mitochondrial mother’s 
act helps the nuclear mother’s egg to function properly rather 
than alter the traits of the egg.147 In the same way that kidney 
donors may not leverage their donation to those that possess 
their kidneys, the mitochondrial mother should not have the 
opportunity to leverage the donation of her mitochondrial DNA 
to insert herself as an additional parent.148 
A rule that the mitochondrial mother has no claim over a 
child conceived through MRT would reduce litigation in that it 
requires people to come together prior to the procedure to 
understand parentage rather than attempting to make a 
retroactive determination once confusion breeds conflict. 
Furthermore, even if litigation arises this rule could work easily 
with the existing precedent and statutes applied to situations 
involving ART. For example, the possibility exists that the 
mitochondrial mother, or another individual, could be a 
surrogate for the resultant egg. In determining the parentage of 
such a situation, the rule argued by this Note would simply 
                                                          
 145. E.g., Dickens, supra note 57, at 90 (determining that a person 
maintains control over an organ until the designated transplantation takes 
place). 
 146. See sources cited supra notes 19–25 (explaining the MRT procedure). 
 147. See Pritchard, supra note 2 (stating that the DNA in the nucleus is the 
DNA that affects physical and mental traits). 
 148. Although outside the scope of this Note, it is important to specify that 
the stance of this Note does not suggest that there are any problems with 
multiparent families. Such familial arrangements are becoming more and more 
commonplace given the increased use of ARTs. See Leiser, supra note 9, at 433. 
However, the adoption of a rule severing a mitochondrial mother’s parentage is 
unlikely to affect multiparent families because MRT should only be used for 
medical use necessary to prevent potential mitochondrial defects. Although the 
approval of MRT is foreseeable in the United States, the use of MRT for 
nonpreventative purposes (for example, if a polyamorous relationship merely 
wanted to each contribute genetically to a child) is unlikely to follow even if 
multiparent families wanted each member to contribute to a child. MRT is still 
experimental and, therefore, the safety of the resulting child is not assured. See 
Pritchard, supra note 2 (“The technique itself could allow the child to inherit 
untried untested medical complications[.]”). Thus, the use of MRT for the 
destruction of two healthy eggs to create one may cause more harm to a 
conceived child than simply making use of a single egg. 
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preempt the intent test in that that the mitochondrial mother 
would not have claim on the child based solely upon her donation 
of mitochondrial DNA. After this step, courts could assign 
parentage by application of a subsequent intent test to ascertain 
what weight should be given to the action of surrogacy. Even 
though MRT is a subsect of ART, the utilization of the MRT rule 
regarding mitochondrial mothers as true donors does not 
complicate future parentage disputes. In the same way that an 
individual without any genetic attachment to a child may insert 
themselves into a relationship with the child through an intent 
test, so too could a mitochondrial mother. The mitochondrial 
mother simply would have no additional pull based upon her 
actions in the MRT process or the donation of mitochondrial 
DNA. 
Lastly, the adoption of this Note’s proposed rule combines 
all the beneficial pieces of each previously mentioned approach: 
this stance takes the bright line rule concept from state statute 
application;149 it incorporates public policy in its development;150 
it takes into account what is best for the child by increasing 
predictability, thereby lowering future litigation over parentage; 
the procedure takes a significant amount of time to set up prior 
to the conception, thereby implying that the parents are 
committed to the child;151 it applies a genetic assessment, but it 
does so while taking into account the type and amount of genes 
contributed;152 and it takes into account the implied intent of the 
parties involved.153 It also allows for the intent test to be applied 
to complex situations after MRT parentage disputes are 
resolved.154 
CONCLUSION 
MRT promises to impact the field of ART. Although it still 
possesses some ethical and practical concerns,155 the practice of 
it now seems medically safe for the first time in history as seen 
                                                          
 149. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 150. See supra Part II.A.1 . 
 151. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 152. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 153. See supra Part II.A.4. 
 154. See supra Part II.B. 
 155. See, e.g., Pritchard, supra note 2 (stating, among others, concerns over 
child health, the possibility of playing God, and that the technique may lead to 
designer children). 
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by its recent success stories.156 Because there also exists a form 
that does not hinge upon the destruction of embryos, the United 
States will likely follow Britain’s example and legalize the use of 
at least one of its forms in the near future.157 Depending on the 
regulations placed on MRT, it may help individuals suffering 
from mitochondrial diseases and infertility bear healthy 
children, and, therefore, grow rapidly in popularity.158 Given 
this likelihood for increased use, MRT will inevitably follow in 
the footsteps of other forms of ART and lead to parentage 
disputes based on the addition of another parent with a genetic 
influence in the resultant child. As such, the legal community 
should proactively ready itself for the legal ramifications of such 
scientific advancements. This Note concludes that MRT clearly 
distinguishes itself from other forms of ART based on the science 
behind it, and, therefore, the traditional forms of assigning 
parentage in disputes involving ART lack applicability to 
situations utilizing MRT. As such, the legal community must 
develop a new applicable rule for the subsect MRT. 
However, adding the rule for MRT as proposed in this Note, 
will not affect the determinations already made in other forms 
of ART. This rule should state that the mitochondrial mother, as 
a true donor, will have no legal parentage rights and, therefore, 
cannot levy the contribution of mitochondrial DNA as grounds 
for parentage. In doing so, the approach will reduce future 
uncertainty and conflict in an inconsistent area of law. 
                                                          
 156. See sources cited supra note 8 (referring to the two most recent healthy 
children born through the use of MRT). 
 157. See Sample, supra note 121. 
 158. See sources cited supra notes 28–31. 
